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Abstract
I critically discuss two dogmas of the “dynamical approach” to spacetime in general rela-
tivity, as advanced by Harvey Brown [Physical Relativity (2005) Oxford:Oxford University
Press] and collaborators. The first dogma is that positing a “spacetime geometry” has no
implications for the behavior of matter. The second dogma is that postulating the “Strong
Equivalence Principle” suffices to ensure that matter is “adapted” to spacetime geometry.
I conclude by discussing “spacetime functionalism”. The discussion is presented in reaction
to and sympathy with recent work by James Read [“Explanation, geometry, and conspiracy
in relativity theory” (20??) Thinking about Spacetime Boston: Birka¨user].
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, James Read (20??) has proposed a detente in an active and ongoing debate
in the foundations of spacetime theories, between defenders of the “geometrical approach”
to spacetime structure and those of the “dynamical approach”, introduced by Brown and
Pooley (1999, 2006) and elaborated and defended by Brown (2005).1 The geometrical view,
Read suggests, has been given an unfair treatment by recent defenders of the dynamical
view—including Read and his collaborators (e.g. Read et al., 2018; Brown and Read, 2016,
20??). Really, there are two versions of the geometrical view that Read detects in the
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1For a recent, but somewhat one-sided, review of this literature, see (Brown and Read, 20??). The
dynamical view is clearly articulated in the papers cited in the main text. But since the “geometrical view”
is the received view, it is somewhat difficult to identify a locus classicus for its statement. I would argue
that the view goes back at least to Weyl (1952 [1918]). It is also the view implicitly found in, for instance,
Hawking and Ellis (1973), Wald (1984), and Malament (2012b); see also Stein (1977), discussed in the final
section of this paper. Friedman (1983), Torretti (1983), and Maudlin (2012) are all sometimes cited as
defenders of the geometrical view.
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literature: what he calls the “unqualified” and “qualified” geometrical approaches. (I will
describe these below.) The first of these, he argues, is untenable. But the second, which he
tentatively attributes to Maudlin (2012) and more confidently attributes to me (Weatherall,
2019), is tenable after all, he says. In fact, Read thinks, on reflection it is hard to see what
the disagreement between the qualified geometrical view and the dynamical view is supposed
to be, at least in the context of general relativity.2 Indeed, Read argues that my 2019 is
best read as endorsing not only the dynamical approach, but also a version of spacetime
functionalism, as introduced by Knox (2013, 2019), which Read sees as an “extension” of
the dynamical approach according to which spacetime is whatever plays the spacetime role,
and “the spacetime role is played by whatever defines a structure of local inertial frames”
(Knox, 2019, p.22).3
There is much to admire in Read’s discussion and I think his ireny is a sign of considerable
progress all around. To the extent that I have summarized it so far, I largely agree with
what he writes, and in what follows, I will offer an analysis that is very similar to his. But
I will come at it from a different perspective—one closer, I think, to the received (that is,
geometrical) view, though I am reluctant to take on such a mantle because I agree with Read
that the two sides, in their most careful moments, are not so clearly different on the issues
that are generally taken to define the debate. I think there is some value in rehashing these
issues from this other perspective, both because it can aid in translating between somewhat
different ways of speaking about the foundations of general relativity; and because I think
it will help isolate where disagreements persist.
The paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by restating some key points from Read’s
2In the context of special relativity, conceived as a separate theory from general relativity, he thinks that
both views are tenable, but that they are clearly distinct and he prefers the dynamical view. See (Read,
2019) for further discussion of issues that are salient to the debate in special relativity, but which will not
concern me in the present article.
3See Baker (2019) and Read and Menon (2019) for critiques of Knox’s view, and (Weatherall, 2019, fn.
40) for a discussion how I see the relationship between my views as discussed there and Knox’s.
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paper in a different way; as I go, I will explain how I take the issues as I raise them to relate
to what Read writes. I will then discuss one important point on which I think there is still
disagreement. As will be clear, setting aside quibbles about terminology, this disagreement
has little to do with the headline questions that have marked the debate, such as whether
geometry is “reducible” to dynamics or whether geometry “explains” the behavior of matter,
and much more to do with the details of what the relationship between dynamics and
geometry is supposed to be.4 Along the way, I will offer critical comments on two “dogmas”
of the dynamical approach: one, already questioned by Read in somewhat different terms, is
the idea that positing a certain geometrical structure for spacetime should be understood to
have no consequences for the dynamics of matter; and the second, which I think has received
too little attention in the literature, is the idea that the “strong equivalence principle”, as
stated by Brown, Read, Knox, and others, suffices to explicate the intended relationship
between matter and geometry in general relativity. I will conclude with some remarks
concerning the bearing of these arguments on spacetime functionalism as discussed by Knox
and others.
2. Isn’t It Irenic?
Consider the following characterization of general relativity:5
General relativity is a theory of spacetime geometry according to which:
[(g)eometry] Spacetime has the structure of a Lorentzian 4-manifold, (M, gab),
the curvature of which is related to the distribution of stress-energy in the uni-
4One might wonder whether the remaining disagreement I identify is really so far from those headline
issues—or if rather, what I am attempting here is to isolate what has always been the core disagreement,
from which the other debates have followed. Perhaps. But if so, I think it is doubly important to focus on
this particular disagreement, because I think it is one that can be substantially resolved with new technical
work. Thank you to Sam Fletcher for raising this point.
5I take for granted the technical details of general relativity in what follows; for background using similar
notation, see Malament (2012b) or Wald (1984).
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verse by Einstein’s equation; and
[(d)ynamics] the dynamical evolution of matter is adapted to this geometry.
This characterization of general relativity is stronger than one sometimes seen in the liter-
ature (for instance, it is stronger than what Read (20??, §2.3.2) provides), since it includes
(i) an explicit interpretation of the spacetime metric, namely as a description of physical
geometry; and (ii) an analysis of what it means to give the metric this interpretation, viz.
(d).6 But I also think it is a fair characterization of what one might (or should) mean by a
“geometrical” view of general relativity.
Now, given this gloss on the theory, one may pose the following two questions.
(I) Is (d) independent of (g)?
(II) Can (d) be made precise, in the sense of giving conditions on matter dynamics such
that those dynamics are “adapted” to the spacetime geometry?
Taking (I) first: this question is the central issue at stake for the dynamical view. In
particular, Brown (2005) argues (in different terms) that (d) is independent of (g); and
moreover, because (d) is independent of (g), (g) alone cannot “explain” how the spacetime
metric, gab, comes to have its “chrono-geometric significance”—that is, (g) alone does not
imply anything about the behavior of light rays, small bodies, or stylized measuring devices
(“rods and clocks”).7 Conversely, Brown and collaborators understand the advocate of the
6For Read (20??), general relativity, or a “general relativistic theory”, is a theory in which there are matter
fields on Lorentzian manifolds, where the matter fields and metric are required to satisfy some system of
differential equations that includes Einstein’s equation sourced by some stress-energy tensor associated with
the matter fields. This statement is similar to mine, except that no constraints are made, in the first
instance, on what that system of equations can be, except that it include Einstein’s equation. Note that
both descriptions of the theory are vague on some important issues, such as how a stress-energy tensor is to
be associated with matter.
7Here and in what follows, I am taking certain stylized facts about the behavior of matter—for instance,
that small massive bodies follow timelike geodesics, light rays follow null geodesics, etc.—to be necessary
for matter to be “adapted” to geometry. (I will have much more to say on this issue below.) To connect
my way of putting things in the main text to other discussions in the literature, I take Brown (2005) to be
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“geometrical view” to deny that (d) is independent of (g), by maintaining that (d) follows
from (g), or at least, that (g) “explains” (d). Read cites authors such as Michael Friedman
(1983) and Tim Maudlin (2012) who speak of spacetime geometry explaining, for instance,
why light rays follow null geodesics in curved spacetime as committed to this position; in
earlier work, Brown and Pooley use Roberto Torretti (1983) as a foil.
Put in these terms, whether the defender of the dynamical view is correct that (d) is
independent of (g) depends on what one means by (g). If by (g) one means—as, apparently,
the defenders of the dynamical approach do, at least when they criticize the geometrical
approach—some bare metaphysical hypothesis about what the “true” geometry of spacetime
is, independent of the behavior of any physical system in that spacetime,8 then it seems true
that (d) does not follow from (g).9 Indeed, on this interpretation, (g) is explicitly understood
in a way that denies any link with (d). But I want to raise the possibility that this is not the
only thing that one might mean by postulating a “spacetime geometry” as in (g). Another
meaning that one might give the expression “spacetime geometry” is precisely that it is
whatever geometry the dynamical evolution of matter is adapted to, in a sense that is at
least roughly understood from examples such as Maxwell’s theory in curved spacetime. From
this perspective, (d) is simply a restatement, or maybe an explication, of (g); and (d) would
follow from (g), properly understood.
claiming that (d) is independent of (g) when he argues that it is only if one assumes the “strong equivalence
principle”, discussed below, that one can explain these behaviors; and likewise, when Read et al. (2018) use
the “two miracles”, also discussed below, as a litmus test for distinguishing the dynamical view from the
geometric view. On this last point, what makes the “two miracles” miraculous is precisely that they do not
follow from any other principles of general relativity—or more specifically, from (g)—and must be taken as
brute facts.
8That is: any other physical system aside from the fields associated with geometry, since one might take
the field gab as a physical system. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging this clarification.
9This interpretation of (g) is not completely contrived: for instance, it is closely related to the under-
standing of “spacetime geometry” at issue when some philosophers and physicists entertain the possibility
that spacetime truly has a Galilean structure even though matter behaves “as if” spacetime is Minkowskian.
In such cases, one makes a claim about the “true” spacetime geometry and leaves open what bearing that has
for dynamics. See the discussion at the end of this section of what Read calls the “unqualified geometrical
approach”.
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How might we understand (g) so that (d) follows from it? The key is to recognize the
often subtle ways in which our mathematical terms are chosen to reflect intended interpre-
tations. We speak of the “length” of a vector and the “length” of a table; the second use of
“length” refers to a property of a physical object, whereas the first refers to a property of a
mathematical one, where one borrows the term because it invokes the idea that the length
of a vector can represent physical lengths. But whatever the original motivation for choos-
ing mathematical language may be, the meaning of such terms may shift as applications
do—and to understand them, we must attend carefully to the context.10 To say spacetime
has a certain geometrical structure according to general relativity is, in the first instance, to
assert that there are facts concerning space and time that are represented, mathematically,
by a structure we associate with “geometry”—viz. a pseudo-Lorentzian metric. These facts
are given names such as “length”, “angle”, “duration”, “distance”, etc. because those are
the words we use in the mathematical context for the corresponding quantities determined
by a metric (borrowing, of course, from prior physical usage). We can summarize all of this
by saying (g) asserts that there are facts about length, angles, etc. that obtain between
events in space and time.11
But what is the physical significance of such assertions in the present context? To
answer that, we observe that the properties of matter represented by matter fields in general
relativity evolve according to certain equations that also invoke precisely those mathematical
10Stein (1977), discussed in the final section of this paper, offers a more detailed historical analysis of how
geometrical language came to have its present significance in relativity theory. Wilson (2006) provides a
more general discussion of how meaning shifts with new applications, particularly in the context of (applied)
mathematics.
11As I hope is clear in the main text, including the paragraph that follows, I am not advocating for, or
attributing to the “geometricist”, any particular view about, say, spacetime substantivalism; the significance
I attribute to claims about “length”, “angle”, etc. are compatible with a broad range of positions in that
debate. (For more on my own view in that connection, see (Weatherall, 2016, 2020).) On a related note,
Acun˜a (2016) describes views along the lines of the one I describe in the text as “absolutist”. He may use
terms as he likes, but it is worth emphasizing that this use of “absolutist” is importantly different from
its usage in connection with, say, Newton’s views on absolute space and time. (See also Read (2019) for a
discussion of Acun˜a in this regard.)
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quantities that we call “lengths”, “angles”, etc., as determined by some metric. For instance,
the wave equation may be understood as asserting that “the integrated length of the gradient
of field strength is extremal in any compact region.”12 Likewise, the source-free Maxwell
equations say “the integrated magnitude of field strength is extremal in any compact region”,
where “magnitude” here is an analogue of length applying to tensors at a point. (Or consider
an older example: “the acceleration of a body under the gravitational influence of another
body is proportional to the square of the distance between them.”) Asserting that space and
time have a certain geometry, then, is just to assert a link between these various appearances
of “lengths”, “angles”, etc. in different parts of the theory: that is, it is to say that the
geometrical relations that matter dynamics advert to are precisely the geometrical relations
one has postulated of the world and summarized with the metric.13
To be sure, even if one takes general relativity to make certain claims regarding “space-
time geometry” in this stronger sense, so that it implies that matter dynamics is adapted to
that geometry, one still has to, at some stage or other, address the issue of what dynamics are
“allowed”, in the sense of adverting to just the relevant geometry. But now one understands
those requirements to be a clarification of what one means by asserting that spacetime has
some geometry in the first place. The mere fact that someone has written down a field with
certain mathematical properties should not be taken to have any consequences for the dy-
namics of matter or “chronogeometry”, as the dynamicist sometimes claims the geometricist
believes. What matters is that it is the intended physical significance of that field that it
does have those consequences. Thus, on this view of spacetime geometry, matter that does
12Here I am invoking the fact that the wave equation is the Euler-Lagrange equation extremizing a certain
action.
13There are other reasons, too, to think that “spacetime geometry” should be interpreted in this stronger
way. Acun˜a (2016) and Myrvold (2019), for instance, argue that the link between geometry and dynamics is
analytic, and thus that all one could mean by attributing a certain geometry to space and time is to say that
matter behaves in particular ways adapted to that geometry. Stein (1977, p. 377-8), meanwhile, emphasizes
the history of the development of geometrical ideas in physics, noting that the idea that spacetime has a
geometry in the first place, in the modern sense, arises from studying the dynamics of matter understood
to “probe” that geometry.
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not have the right sort of dynamics is simply incompatible with general relativity.14
All that said, at this point the debate begins to seem terminological. Once we agree that
(d) is necessary, and the issue becomes only whether (g) should be understood in such a
way as to subsume (d) or whether it is better to state (d) separately (just to be safe), it is
hard to see much of substance left to the disagreement.15
This conclusion substantially recapitulates Read (20??). Still, he puts the point some-
what differently. As noted above, he suggests that there are two versions of the geometric
view. One of these, which he calls the “unqualified geometrical approach” (UGA), maintains
that (d) follows from (g), but apparently interprets (g) in a weak way, such that it is hard to
see how the defender of this view could possibly get from (g) to (d)—and Read (20??), fol-
lowing Brown (2005) and Read et al. (2018), offer numerous examples of theories that seem
to show you cannot. The other geometrical view, which he calls the “qualified geometrical
approach” (QGA), meanwhile, supplements (g), or understands it in a stronger way, such
14An anonymous referee raises the following worry: is it not the case that physicists often impose “extra”
constraints on matter fields, such as energy conditions, which might be understood as limiting attention to
just some of the many matter fields that are prima facie compatible with relativity theory (but which we
reject on other grounds)? The answer is complicated by the different energy conditions in the literature
and the various roles they play. But I would argue (a) at least in some cases, some energy conditions (such
as the dominant energy condition—see note 18) serve as a guide to whether a proposed matter dynamics
is suitably compatible with general relativity (e.g., Maxwell’s equations are compatible, in part because
solutions always satisfy the dominant energy condition relative to whatever metric appears in the equations
and stress-energy tensor; but arguably tachyon fields are not, because this condition fails), so that they are
not “imposed” so much as “checked”; (b) in other cases, such as in proving singularity theorems, one uses
energy conditions as a stand-in assumption, capturing the idea that one is considering only “reasonable”
matter (which may be glossed as: matter compatible with the theory), so that although one has to impose
a condition, doing so reflects precisely the relationship between matter and geometry described here; and
(c) in yet other cases, energy conditions are introduced for technical convenience but have obscure physical
motivation. This list may not be exhaustive, but I believe it covers the main cases.
15This is not to say that there have not been other disagreements of substance adjacent to the one
discussed here. For instance, there was a real disagreement, now resolved, regarding whether in general
relativity, the geodesic principle (discussed in what follows) is a “consequence of Einstein’s equation”; for
more on this, see Brown (2005), Malament (2012a), and Weatherall (2011). There is also an unresolved (I
believe) disagreement about whether there is some salient difference between general relativity and other
theories, such as Newtonian gravitation, regarding the status of inertial motion (Weatherall, 2011; Sus,
2014; Weatherall, 2017). Finally, there have been disputes about whether spacetime geometry can provide
“constructive explanations” (Brown and Pooley, 1999, 2006; Janssen, 2009; Dorato, 2007; Frisch, 2011;
Acun˜a, 2016; Read, 2019); and about whether one can even state matter dynamics without specifying some
geometrical background (Norton, 2008; Wallace, 2019).
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that one assumes (for instance) that the metric and its associated Levi-Civita derivative
enter into the matter dynamics in certain ways, so that matter dynamics are assumed, or
required, to be adapted to the spacetime geometry. (It is the QGA that I have called the
geometric view above.) Here, Read argues, (d) does follow from (g) (or, trivially, from (g)
and (d) together); and in some cases one might even concede that (g) explains (d). It is the
QGA that Read suggests is indistinguishable from the dynamical view as he understands it.
3. A Little Too Irenic
So much for (I)—and for agreement. I will now turn to (II). Let us stipulate that we require
both (g) and (d). Even so, it would be desirable to have some precision and clarity on what
(d) means. In particular, what sorts of matter dynamics are compatible with (d)?
There are really two separate questions that one might like to answer here. First, one
would like to know if we can identify:
(A) Features that “adapted” dynamics will (necessarily?) have.
Some generally accepted candidates for (A)—the hallmarks of adapted dynamics—are often
thought of as “principles” of general relativity: the dynamics should imply, or at least be
consistent with, the idea that small massive bodies follow timelike geodesics (the “geodesic
principle”); that certain kinds of matter, in an “optical” or “ray” limit, follow null geodesics;
that clocks record arclength (or “proper time”) along their trajectories (the “clock hypothe-
sis”); that various energy conditions are satisfied; and so on. But it is often difficult to even
state these conditions clearly and precisely, at least in a way that makes any direct connec-
tion to the sorts of systems of differential equations (e.g., Maxwell’s equations) that express
matter dynamics in general relativity. Thus it is not entirely clear how (A) is supposed to
be related to (d). To address this gap, one might also wish to identify:
(B) Necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a system of partial differential equations to
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exhibit the features of “adapted dynamics”.
In other words, with (B) we are looking for conditions on matter dynamics such that the
features identified in (A) obtain.
To this end, there are various heuristics available for constructing matter theories, in
the sense of systems of partial differential equations, that one expects to be adapted to a
given spacetime geometry. These heuristics go by names such as “minimal coupling”, “the
comma to semicolon rule”, etc. But these heuristics are sometimes ambiguous, and in any
case, it is not clear that they work, in the sense that it is not clear that these heuristics
necessarily generate theories that exhibit the features (A) that we require for dynamics to
be “adapted to the geometry”. What one would really like, in my view, would be theorems
of the following form
Let (M, gab) be a relativistic spacetime. Any system of partial differential equa-
tions on M , with such and such further properties [e.g., identified via one of the
heuristics just notes] will be adapted to the geometry of (M, gab)”.
Of course, this is not a precise statement, both because the antecedent has not been specified
and because the consequent is not precise. It is also not clear that one wants a single theorem,
here; more likely is that there will be a network of results, demonstrating the ways in which
different senses of “being adapted to the geometry” imply and constrain one another.16
One route to making this sort of schematic statement more precise is to use small body
motion as a candidate for (A). The idea, here, is that the geodesic principle, which states
that in the absence of external forces, free massive test bodies traverse timelike geodesics
of the spacetime metric, provides a link between “geometrically privileged” curves—that
is, the geodesics, a class of curves picked out by the metric—and “physically privileged”
16I explore this idea, that the principles of a theory should be understood to form a network of logical
interdependencies, in (Weatherall, 2017), where I call it “the puzzleball conjecture”.
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curves—namely, the trajectories of small, force-free bodies. A similar link is provided by the
“light ray principle”, that light rays follow null geodesics. These links suggest a candidate
interpretation for at least part of what it means for matter dynamics to be “adapted to
the geometry”: namely, differential equations are “adapted to the geometry” (only) if the
solutions of those equations, in some appropriate small-body limit, (only) follow (timelike
or null) geodesics. One might then try to identify generic conditions on matter equations
(i.e., candidates for (B)) that allow one to conclude that matter is adapted to the geometry
in this way.
And of course, as has been widely discussed in the recent philosophical literature, such
theorems exist. For instance, the main result of (Geroch and Weatherall, 2018) may be
put as follows.17 Fix a spacetime (M, gab), and let ∇ be the Levi-Civita derivative operator
associated with gab. Suppose that C is a collection of smooth, symmetric rank two tensor
fields—say, the stress-energy tensors associated with the solutions to some matter field
equations—and suppose that those fields are all divergence-free with respect to ∇ and that
they all satisfy a certain energy condition with respect to gab.
18 Then the collection C tracks
(only) timelike or null geodesics. This, in turn, implies that these are the only curves around
which “small-body-like” solutions can propagate.19
Now, as I emphasize in (Weatherall, 20??), the stress-energy tensors associated with so-
lutions to standard “relativistic” equations, such as the source-free Maxwell’s equations and
the Klein-Gordon equation (but not the Dirac equation), necessarily satisfy the two condi-
tions stated. Moreover, as I note in (Weatherall, 2019), drawing on well-known arguments
17See (Weatherall, 20??) for a discussion of these results aimed at philosophers.
18 Specifically, Geroch and Weatherall require the dominant energy condition, which holds of a tensor T ab
at a point if, for any pair ξa, ηa of timelike vectors there, T abξaηb ≥ 0.
19Note that although tracking has this consequence, one might also take tracking—for the details of
which I refer the reader to (Geroch and Weatherall, 2018)—to provide a direct link between the solutions
of a system of partial differential equations and curves that does not need to go through small bodies. So
tracking could itself count as a partial explication of being “adapted to the geometry”. See (Weatherall,
20??) for more on this idea.
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(e.g. in Wald, 1984, appendix E), the stress-energy tensor associated with any matter field
will be divergence-free, thereby satisfying one of the two conditions, as long as its dynamics
are determined by a Lagrangian with certain properties—basically, one in which the space-
time metric and associated derivative operator play certain roles, in a sense I make precise
there.
One might ask for still more. For instance, it would be very nice to have a general
argument capturing necessary conditions for the dominant energy condition, which is needed
for the Geroch-Weatherall theorem, to be satisfied by the stress-energy tensors associated
with arbitrary solutions to a differential equation, analogous to the conditions under which
that tensor is guaranteed to be divergence-free. One imagines such results are possible,
though the details are not perfectly clear, in part because it is known that solutions to
some “relativistic” equations, such as the Dirac equation and some scalar field equations,
do not necessarily have this property.20 Does this mean that they are not “adapted to the
geometry”? Or does it mean that we need a broader understanding of that expression?
One might also ask whether there are other results in this neighborhood that would
capture a more expansive notion of what it means for matter to be adapted to spacetime
geometry. For instance, could one capture something like the “clock hypothesis”, which
states that suitably ideal clocks measure arclength along their worldlines? Fletcher (2013)
makes some progress along these lines, but it relies on a particular construction (that of
the “light clock”);21 one might ask for something more general, such as a result to the
effect that any “periodic” behavior, suitably defined, associated with solutions to matter
field equations satisfying certain conditions (candidates for (B)), measures arclength in a
suitable small body limit. I do not know if such results can be achieved, but they would be
a further elaboration of this research project. One could also try to show that such matter
20Curiel (2017) provides a general discussion of cases where various energy conditions are known to fail.
21To be clear, Fletcher is not committed to using his result for the purposes I sketch here, and so what I
write in the main text should not be taken as a criticism of his result.
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does not propagate superluminally, for instance in the sense of “signal velocity” defined by
Geroch (2011).22
The line of research I have just described is one, still incomplete, approach to answering
(II). But it is apparently not the one favored by the Brown and collaborators. And here,
I think, is a point where there remains potentially significant disagreement between the
“dynamical school”—that is, the avowed defenders of the dynamical view—and others.23
In particular, Read et al. (2018, pp. 15-6), following Brown (2005, pp. 169-171; 176),
offer a different analysis of (d). Those authors apparently assert that the so-called “strong
equivalence principle” (SEP) is necessary (and also sufficient?) for (d) to hold.24
Here the strong equivalence principle is understood as the following statement:25
There exists in a neighborhood of each event preferred coordinates, called locally
inertial at that event. For each fundamental non-gravitational interaction, to
the extent that tidal gravitational forces can be ignored, the laws governing the
interaction find their simplest form in these coordinates. This is their special
relativistic form, independent of spacetime location. (Brown, 2005, p. 169)
On Read’s presentation, at least, the idea is that we should understand general relativity to
be a theory (and here I am switching to Read’s own way of presenting things) whose “dy-
namically possible” models consist of a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab), along with other fields
representing matter, such that (i) the matter fields (and their interactions) are associated
22Earman (2014) and Weatherall (2014) also discuss this definition, including ways in which it does and
does not align with, for instance, the dominant energy condition and other senses in which matter might be
said to be “relativistic”.
23I say “dynamical school” because I do not believe that there is an essential link between the program I
will presently describe and the dynamical view as I have presented it, viz., the idea that (d) is independent
of (g) on a weak reading of (g). And yet defenses of the dynamical view seem invariably to invoke the
“strong equivalence principle” or similar ideas in what I take to be a problematic way.
24Read (20??, p. 10-11) writes that the SEP is an “important condition for the chronogeometricity of the
metric field” (p. 10), but hedges on whether it should be viewed as strictly necessary, sufficient, or jointly
sufficient along with some other assumptions. In more recent correspondence, Read has suggested his views
have shifted on this issue, and that he now sees the SEP primarily as establishing a link between general
relativity and special relativity.
25The status of the SEP is discussed in some detail in a very nice paper by Brown and Read (2016); see
also Read et al. (2018) and Fletcher (20??).
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with stress-energy tensors, and the metric gab satisfies Einstein’s equation with the sum of
these stress-energy tensors as its source; and (ii) the matter fields satisfy certain differential
equations that are compatible with the SEP. In other words, the SEP is a constraint on
matter fields; and if it is not satisfied, then we do not have a truly “generally relativistic”
theory. It is for this reason that I take satisfaction of the SEP to be a proposal concerning
precisely what is meant by (d).
I would like to raise two concerns about the proposal that the SEP, as just stated, is a
satisfactory way of making precise the idea that “matter dynamics are adapted to spacetime
geometry”.26 The first concern is that it is not clear what the strong equivalence principle
says.27 And the second concern is that it is not clear that the SEP is sufficient.
3.1. The SEP is Not Clear
What is unclear about the SEP? There are several issues. One, which Brown, Read, and
others acknowledge, is that it is not clear what it means to say “to the extent that tidal
gravitational forces can be ignored”. Here is just one reason one might be worried about
this issue. The SEP, as a foundational principle, is supposed to hold in all regimes. But
then how are we to understand “strong field” regimes, where curvature, by various natural
measures, is large, or unbounded along a curve? To what extent can tidal forces, or curvature
26There is a long history of controversy over the equivalence principle in its various guises, where semi-
precise statements are offered and then shown to be inadequate for one reason or another. I do not mean to
engage in this debate here: my goal is not to argue that Brown or Read has failed to capture what Einstein
had in mind when he formulated his principle, nor do I wish to claim that this or any other version of the
equivalence principle is trivial or false. I am specifically interested in the question of whether the assertion
that I have called the strong equivalence principle, as elaborated and elucidated by Read, adequately captures
the idea that matter dynamics are “adapted to spacetime geometry”. Moreover, although I do mean to
criticize one aspect of how Brown and Read have used the SEP, it is hardly as if Brown, much less Read,
has invented this principle: it is common fare in textbooks on general relativity (e.g. Misner et al., 1973,
p. 386). The concerns I am raising are as much directed at these classic textbook treatments as at the
contemporary philosophers who have invoked them.
27The first concern is similar in several important respects to arguments made by Fletcher (20??); I did
not see that manuscript until this one was drafted, but my perspective was certainly shaped by conversations
with him.
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more generally, be ignored in these regimes—such as when the components of the curvature
tensor, expressed in “locally inertial” coordinates, are larger than any other quantity under
consideration? One presumably would like to say that the SEP holds approximately in all
cases, but this notion of approximation is subtle, and it has not been clearly laid out. As
I say, however, this concern has been raised previously, so I will not focus on it here; just
suffice it to say that until one is clear about what this proviso means, it is very difficult to
establish what sort of equations do in fact satisfy the SEP, or what the consequences of the
SEP are.
Here is another issue, however, which I do not think has received adequate discussion in
the literature.28 It concerns the role that the expression “simplest form” plays in Brown’s
version of the SEP.29 One issue, here, is that it is not clear how to evaluate whether an
equation is in its “simplest” form: it seems background assumptions about simplicity and
conventions about how to express equations must go into such judgments.30 For instance,
it is not clear why one should expect the simplest form of any equation relating structures
that can be characterized in a coordinate independent manner to be a representation in
certain coordinates; one might even think that insofar as any coordinate representation of
28My framing of this issue is particularly indebted to conversations with Sam Fletcher; a number of closely
related issues are addressed in Fletcher (20??) and Fletcher and Weatherall (2020).
29There is a third issue here that I do not emphasize, which is that it is not clear why special relativity is
given primacy of place a century after general relativity superseded it. In particular, when one introduces a
new matter theory—say, a theory of an inflaton field in the early universe—why should one be obligated to
first identify a “special relativistic” form for the dynamical equations of that theory? One possible answer—
and I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this—is that the Brown-Pooley constructive/dynamical
relativity program was originally developed in the context of Minkowski spacetime, and that Brown then
aims to extend it to general relativity. (This observation is perhaps connected to Read’s position that
the dynamical and geometric approaches are distinct in the context of special relativity—but collapse once
one moves to general relativity.) From this perspective, it arguably does make sense to interpret general
relativity through the lens of an already-worked-out position on special relativity. But even so, I think it
would be preferable if one could do the work the SEP is meant to do, at least for establishing (d) in general
relativity, without using a different theory as a crutch. Moreover, the approach to (d) that I defend above,
involving results such as those of (Geroch and Weatherall, 2018), works just as well for special relativity as
for general relativity, since any general result will hold in flat spacetime as a special case.
30Read et al. (2018) suggest that the simplest form of an equation is one in which no terms vanish by
coordinate transformation, but I find this account inadequate for reasons that I hope will be clear presently.
See note 34.
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an equation invokes some further structure—namely, a choice of coordinates—it is ipso facto
less simple than a coordinate independent expression of the same equation. (Of course, this
is not what Brown has in mind; he means something like the “simplest form among all
coordinate expressions”.) To be sure, the issue is not that Brown requires that the form
be simple, per se; simplicity in some coordinate system or other is not itself a virtue of
equations. Rather, the issue is that Brown wishes to use something about the form of the
equations as a signal that those equations are appropriately adapted to certain coordinate
systems or to certain other structure. “Simplicity” is just a way of trying to get at what
characterizes equations that are so-adapted. The trouble is that the “simplicity” of the form
of an equation is not a sufficiently clear or unambiguous notion to play this role, at least
without further work.
But there is a deeper worry lurking here. The thing whose simplicity is being evaluated
is the “form” of the equation, i.e., its syntactic expression, relative to certain (unspecified)
conventions concerning how to “express” an equation in certain coordinates. But one might
have expected, from the very fact that equations can take more or less simple forms, that
“equations”, properly construed as mathematical objects, do not stand in one-to-one corre-
spondence with expressions for those equations.31 And indeed, this is true. And even within
a single coordinate system, there may be multiple different ways of expressing the same
“equation”, in the sense of expressing a relationship between variables that is satisfied by
the same objects, some of which are simpler than others even within a coordinate system;
and some of these ways of expressing an equation may take apparently simpler forms in
different coordinates.
These are abstract claims, so let me illustrate with an example. Fix a spacetime (M, gab).
31This is just a reflection of the well-known fact that propositions can be given many different provably
equivalent syntactic forms, e.g., p, p ∧>, p ∧⊥, etc., some of which are simpler than others (irrespective of
any choice of coordinates). Fletcher (20??) raises a similar concern with minimal coupling, arguing that it
is “hyperintensional” in the sense that it distinguishes between cases that ought to be seen as equivalent.
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We will say (following Brown) that coordinates in a neighborhood of a point p ∈ M are
“locally inertial at p relative to gab”, or just “adapted to gab”, if gab, expressed in those
coordinates, is diagonal and normalized at p; and the Christoffel symbols for the Levi-Civita
derivative operator associated with gab vanish at p. Such coordinates can always be found
at any point, for any Lorentzian metric. Now consider, for instance, the following system of
equations in Minkowski spacetime, (M, ηab):
∇˜aF ab = 0 (1a)
∇˜[aFbc] = 0, (1b)
where ∇˜ is the unique derivative operator such that ∇˜a(Ω2ηbc) = 0 for some (fixed) non-
vanishing, non-constant smooth scalar field Ω.32
Do these equations satisfy the SEP? To answer this, we need to determine whether these
equations take their “simplest form” in locally inertial coordinate systems relative to ηab. I
believe, based on how Brown approaches similar examples, that the answer should be “no”.
These equations take their simplest form in coordinate systems that are locally inertial
relative to the metric Ω2ηab, not ones that are locally inertial relative to ηab. As evidence
for this, observe that, expressed in coordinates adapted to ηab, the Christoffel symbols that
appear in the first of these equations will not vanish, while they will vanish in coordinates
locally inertial relative to Ω2ηab. It appears to follow that these equations do not satisfy the
SEP. But this would be a surprising conclusion, since after all these are simply Maxwell’s
equations in Minkowski spacetime—that is, they determine the same solutions—where I
have written them in a form that exploits the well-known conformal invariance of those
equations.33
32Here [·] indicates antisymmetrization on indices; and I raise and lower indices using ηab, the Minkowski
metric.
33One might worry that Eqs. 1 are not, after all, equations “in” Minkowski spacetime—say, because the
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One might respond that Maxwell’s equations take “equally simple” forms not only in
the coordinates adapted to ηab, but in others as well; this is compatible with the SEP, since
after all, the SEP does not say that these equations take their simplest forms only in locally
inertial frames. This is a fair observation, but it is not to the point, which is that it is not
clear how to tell which form is to count as the simplest, or what operations are allowed to
simplify them.34 Put another way: defenders of the SEP have not provided a clear criterion
of individuation for equations, such that one can say when two different strings correspond to
a single equation in different forms, as opposed to different equations. In the present case, it
turned out that there were additional operations, beyond simply expressing the equations in
a particular coordinate system, that could be performed on the equations while preserving a
crucial feature of those equations—that is, their class of solutions—to simplify them further
within some coordinates. How were we to know these were available (especially since they
are not available for all equations, such as the Klein-Gordon equation)? The answer is by
studying the transformations that preserve something other than the form of the equation—
specifically, its solutions. I take this to mean that what is—or should be—at issue in the
SEP is not really the “form” of an equation at all, but rather properties of the equation
that are intrinsic to the equation, i.e., that are invariant under different forms the equation
might take. That the equation takes a certain form, with certain conventions, using certain
background knowledge about the equation, is at best an indirect guide to those properties
and at worst too ambiguous to be useable.
derivative operator and metric appearing in the equations are not the Minkowski metric and derivative op-
erator, or because they do not take their “simplest form” in coordinates adapted to ηab—even though they
have precisely the same solutions. For my own part, I do not think this is a compelling position, because I
think the most natural sense, mathematically, of “same (differential) equation” is “has the same solutions”.
But if one wishes to argue that the cogency of the SEP depends on adopting a different standard of equiva-
lence for equations, that route is certainly available—but the very fact that there could be disagreements on
this point shows that the SEP is unclear in just the way I am claiming, because the class of manipulations
that preserve an equation have not been specified.
34 This argument is why I do not take the claim that equations are in their simplest form if terms do not
drop out by changing coordinates to be satisfactory, because there may be other transformations available
that further simplify equations.
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How might one get at these properties of equations? One strategy would be to look to
symmetry properties of the equations as a way of identifying the relevant “intrinsic” structure
of those equations, independent of particular representational choices. Read, following (Read
et al., 2018), proposes a further clarification of the SEP that appears to adopt this strategy.35
He writes (after setting aside issues about “neglecting gravitational forces”):
For today, the essential aspect of the SEP is the imposition that, in the neigh-
borhood of any p ∈ M in GR, laws of physics recover their ‘special relativis-
tic form’—where I shall understand this to mean: a Poincare´ invariant form.
Clearly, this is a particular restriction on the matter sector in the theory. (Read,
20??, p. 9)
Here having a “Poincare´ invariant form” is replacing the idea of having a “special relativistic
form” (or a “simplest form”). The same concepts appear in Read and collaborators’ discus-
sions of the “miracles” of relativity, which may similarly be read as an elaboration of the
SEP.
MR1: All non-gravitational interactions are locally governed by Poincare´ in-
variant dynamical laws. (Read, 20??, p. 14)
MR2: The Poincare´ symmetries of the dynamical laws governing non-gravitational
fields in the neighbourhood of any point p ∈M coincide (in the regime in which
‘gravitational forces’ can be ignored) with the symmetries of the metric field in
that neighborhood. (Read, 20??, pp. 14-5)
In other words, it is not merely that all of the laws are required to have a certain symmetry
property; it is that those symmetry properties must be appropriately coordinated, both
across different matter fields and with the spacetime metric.
The invocation of the “symmetries of the metric in [a] neighborhood” (emphasis added)
in the statement of the second miracle suggests that Read might have in mind a standard
35It is not clear that Read’s motivation for using a symmetry condition is to avoid possible ambiguities
arising from the notion of the “form” of an equation; the motivation offered in (Read et al., 2018), for
instance, is the concern that curvature terms may appear in some equations that “should” satisfy the SEP.
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definition of the “local symmetries” of a metric, which associates such symmetries with the
existence of Killing fields in a neighborhood of a point; this notion of local symmetry might
then be extended to capture the idea of a “local symmetry” of an equation.36 But this notion
of “local symmetry” cannot be quite what Read is looking for.37 The difficulty concerns the
role that the proviso “in the regime in which ‘gravitational forces’ can be ignored” plays
in the second miracle, where these local symmetries are invoked. In a general spacetime
(M, gab), if the curvature tensor is non-vanishing at a point, or even if it vanishes at that
point but is non-vanishing in every neighborhood of that point, the metric will in general have
no “local symmetries”, in the sense of having no Killing fields. (Conversely, if the curvature
tensor does vanish in a neighborhood of a point, the metric does have Killing fields in that
neighborhood.) It is not clear how assuming that curvature is “sufficiently small” or “locally
negligible” avoids this issue; and it means that the second miracle becomes trivial in the
context of curved spacetimes.38
One might reply by saying “the second miracle has bite precisely in those cases where
the metric does have local symmetries; and the SEP rules out equations that, in highly
symmetric cases (say, in flat spacetime), have symmetries that do not coincide with the
metric symmetries”. But this does not seem like an option that is open to Read, because
the first miracle explicitly states that the “local symmetries” of the dynamical laws are
supposed to (always) include the Poincare´ group, while the second miracle states that these
36Recall that a Killing field of a metric gab is a vector field ξ
a satisfying Killing’s equation: ∇(aξb) = 0,
where ∇ is the Levi-Civita derivative operator associated with gab. Killing’s equation implies that the Lie
derivative of gab along ξ
a vanishes, which in turn means that there exists locally a one parameter family of
isometries generated by ξa. These isometries are “local symmetries” in the straightforward sense that they
are local maps that preserve the metric. See Malament (2012b, §1.9) for more details on Killing fields.
37Read (20??, §2.2) discusses the notion of symmetry that he does have in mind, and appears to identify
it with “isometries”, which would suggest that Killing fields are the generators of local symmetries in his
sense; he goes on to acknowledge that the “the metric field gab in GR need not in general gave any non-trivial
symmetries” (p. 6). This shows, I think, that there are internal tensions in his discussion of the miracles
that bear on the SEP, and which are worth discussing.
38There is another problem with this condition, which is that even if cases, with curvature, where one
does have a Killing field, in general those fields will not correspond to “Poincare´ symmetries”.
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are supposed to coincide with the local metric symmetries, and in general the Killing fields
of a metric at a point do not include the (generators of the) Poincare´ group.
Besides, even if one were to weaken the statement of the first miracle, focusing on cases
in which the local symmetries of the metric are the (generators of) the Poincare´ group (i.e.,
focus on flat spacetime), it would not help. Consider the equation ∇a∇aϕ + ξRϕ = 0 on
a spacetime (M, gab), where R is the curvature scalar and ξ 6= 0 is some number. In any
neighborhood where curvature vanishes identically, this equation will reduce to the wave
equation, and presumably will satisfy the SEP (if we use the miracles as a guide).39 But this
is presumably the wrong verdict, since if one were to express this equation in coordinates
in which the metric is diagonal at a point and all Christoffel symbols vanish at that point,
a curvature term would still appear, which I would think means that the equation is not in
a “special relativistic form”. (On the other hand, perhaps we are supposed to ignore this
curvature term, since we are assumed to be operating in “in the regime in which ‘gravitational
forces’ can be ignored”.)40
One might also reply by saying that I am placing too much emphasis on exact symme-
tries; really, what Read et al. need is a notion of “approximate” Poincare´ symmetry, where
the degree of approximation improves as curvature approaches zero. The idea of an “ap-
proximate symmetry” is notoriously difficult to make precise, however, and seems to require
reference to some background structure. For instance, Fletcher (20??) proposes a natu-
ral, but frame-dependent, definition of “approximate (Poincare´) symmetries”, which may
be extended to a notion of “approximate Killing fields”. Here, the notion of “approximate
39Likewise, if one has Killing fields in a neighborhood of a point, then the one parameter families of
isometries generated by those Killing fields will be “symmetries” of this equation, in the natural sense that
for any solution ϕ in that neighborhood, the pullback of ϕ along each isometry in the family will also solve
the equation in an appropriate neighborhood.
40Given the analyses in Read et al. (2018) and Brown and Read (2016), one might think that curva-
ture terms are compatible with the SEP, properly construed, as long as they appear only in second order
equations. One might take this to mean that various “non-minimally coupled” scalar fields should count
as satisfying the SEP. But then consider the (first-order) equation ∇aξa +Rξaξa = 0. The same argument
applies.
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symmetry” at issue is one in which the change in the spacetime metric at a point as one
flows along a vector field, as determined by a positive definite metric (given by a choice of
frame field) is less than some choice of , for sufficiently small values of the flow parameter.
Could Fletcher’s proposal help Brown and Read? At first glance the answer may seem
to be “yes”. In particular, Fletcher shows that every Lorentzian manifold has approximate
Poincare´ symmetries, to any degree of approximation, in sufficiently small neighborhoods
of every point. He also shows that the approximate local Poincare´ symmetries of a met-
ric can come apart from the Poincare´ symmetries of a system of equations, in the sense
that there exist examples of equations in a relativistic spacetime that do not exhibit local
Poincare´ invariance (at least on one construal of what it means for equations to have such a
property)—even though all spacetimes have local approximate Poincare´ symmetry.41 This
claim seems compatible with, and even supportive of, the idea that it is “miraculous” that
these symmetries might be said to coincide for the equations governing realistic matter. But
on further reflection, I do not think the approximate Poincare´ symmetries Fletcher considers
could possibly play the requisite role in the SEP. The reason is that the notion of “approxi-
mate local symmetry” that Fletcher defines is far too permissive. In particular, every vector
field on a manifold M is an approximate local symmetry, in sufficiently small neighborhoods
of any point p ∈ M , for any smooth metric on M at all—purely by continuity consider-
ations. Hence, although there is always some representation of the Poincare´ algebra (i.e.,
the generators of the Poincare´ group) in the vector fields in a neighborhood of any point
such that it is true that any Lorentzian metric has “local approximate Poincare´ invariance”,
that representation is not unique, and moreover, the same would hold for many other Lie
algebras as well. Thus, on this understanding of “local approximate symmetry”, there is a
41On the other hand, Fletcher’s example is that of a dust field in Minkowski spacetime, which is not
“locally Poincare´ invariant” because its equations take an especially “simple form” in comoving coordinates.
That this example might fail to satisfy the SEP suggests that something has gone badly wrong in the whole
program. But I set this issue aside, because I think it is ultimately a red herring for present purposes.
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strong sense in which the second miracle would trivialize.
Having now considered what Read (and Brown) apparently do not mean by “local
(Poincare´) symmetry” (but which one might have thought they would mean), I will consider
what it seems they do have in mind. Here Appendix A to (Read et al., 2018) is especially
helpful.42 There, the authors of that paper present an argument that “minimally coupled
dynamical equations in GR manifest local Poincare´ invariance”. They proceed by fixing co-
ordinates in a neighborhood of a point p; expressing a given equation in that neighborhood
in those coordinates (including expressing derivatives and curvature tensors using partial
derivatives and Christoffel symbols); and then showing that the syntactic expression of each
term in this equation does not change under certain coordinate transformations—namely,
those that are “relatively constant” (i.e., have the same domain and give rise to the same
partial derivative operator) and which do not change the expression of the metric at p.
Terms (i.e., summands) in an equation whose expression is unchanged by this procedure are
said to be “locally Poincare´ invariant”; an equation is “locally Poincare´ invariant” if each of
its terms is.43
It is clear from this that, by construction, any Lorentzian metric is “locally Poincare´
invariant”; but it is equally clear, as has already been suggested, that this notion of “local
symmetry” has nothing to do with Killing fields or local isometries, nor is it really a notion
of symmetry “in a neighborhood”, so much as “at a point”. Note, too, that this notion
42I take the manipulations there to be consistent with the definitions given in (Read, 20??, §2.2): “A
coordinate transformation is a dynamical symmetry just in case the dynamical equations governing non-
gravitational fields take the same form in coordinate systems related by that transformation” (pp.6-7).
Dewar (2020) also engages in detail with this appendix.
43 Here is a stab at a more precise, less “syntactic” statement. One can always find, in a sufficiently small
neighborhood of p, a flat metric ηab that agrees with gab at p, and whose Levi-Civita derivative operator ∇¯
agrees with that of gab at p. This metric is essentially unique, in the sense that any two such metrics are
related, within a sufficiently small neighborhood of p, by an isometry that leaves p fixed. Rewrite derivatives
in your equation in terms of ∇¯ and a tensor field Cabc. Say a geometrical object X (i.e., one for which a
pushforward is defined) is “locally Poincare´ invariant” (relative to ηab) if for any smooth, smoothly invertible
map ϕ from a sufficiently small neighborhood of p to itself, which acts as an isometry for ηab and leaves p
fixed, is such that ϕ∗(X)|p = X|p. Note that on this recovery, “Poincare´” seems like a misnomer, since we
do not consider translations.
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of symmetry is also not a candidate notion for “dynamical symmetry” in anything like the
standard sense of that term, because it does not relate solutions of a differential equation
to other solutions of the equation; it just relates “expressions” to “expressions”, and does
so only at a point.44 Finally, on this interpretation of what Brown and Read have in mind,
it would appear that equations, including equations that are first order in a matter field,
that include curvature terms, may satisfy the SEP. Indeed, the construction is such that
any equation whose terms are (non-zero) vectors will fail to be Poincare´ invariant; whereas
any scalar term will automatically count as Poincare´ invariant, even if that scalar results
as the inner product (say) of vectors or tensors.45 But perhaps the most important point
is just this: although in moving from “simplest form” to “Poincare´ invariant form”, Read
and collaborators invoke a symmetry principle in their new definitions, it still concerns
purely syntactic information, namely, how an expression looks when written according to a
particular convention. And so the worries expressed above continue to hold.
I have presented a number of arguments in this subsection, all to the effect that the SEP
is not sufficiently clear, so that one cannot unambiguously determine whether it holds of a
given system of equations. In the next subsection, I will present another argument against
the SEP, as formulated above, which I take to be ultimately more important. But before
proceeding, it may be valuable to briefly summarize what has gone so far. The concerns I
have raised may be condensed into four main points: First, as has been noted by others, it
is not clear what it means to say “to the extent that tidal forces can be ignored”; second,
44Moreover, if one recovers the condition as in the previous footnote, in general “local Poincare´ transfor-
mations” will not take solutions to solutions for standard equations, including, e.g., Maxwell’s equations in
curved spacetime.
45Compare the claim here that any equation whose summands are vectors cannot be Poincare´ invariant,
which holds simply because the components of any non-zero vector will always change when one applies a
Lorentz boost or rotation, to the discussion surrounding (Read et al., 2018, Eq. A.12), where the authors
apparently claim that an equation with terms of just this character is Poincare´ invariant. I believe that
their claim is a slip, and that their argument turns on an ambiguity about whether the sense of “same form
in a coordinate system” is supposed to mean “same components” (which is how I have interpreted them
here) or “same symbolic representation”, which I fear is trivial, since one is free to use whatever symbols
one likes.
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it is not clear how to make precise the notion of “simplest form” of a system of equations,
and different informal understandings of this notion seem to yield different conclusions;
third clear identity criteria for equations have not been given, so that one cannot determine
when one has a single system of equations expressed in multiple forms (some of which may
be simpler than others) as opposed to distinct equations, and thus it is not clear what
manipulations of equations are permitted when trying to determine their simplest form; and
finally, fourth, a precise notion of “(approximate) local symmetry” that captures a non-
trivial relationship between the symmetries of an equation and the symmetries of a metric
has not been given, at least in curved spacetime.
3.2. The SEP is not Sufficient
I will now turn to the second concern. Suppose the difficulties just noted can be overcome and
we have a clear and precise formulation of the SEP, such that one can, without ambiguity,
determine whether a given system of differential equations satisfies it; and it expresses
something about the “instrinsic” character of a system of equations, and not their expression.
(I think this is very likely possible, though it would involve introducing different methods
from those usually employed in this literature.) Then as in the arguments offered above,
one would presumably expect it to follow that such a system is, indeed, “adapted to the
spacetime geometry” in the sense that, for instance, solutions to equations satisfying the
SEP, in the small body limit, follow timelike or null geodesics or ideal clocks constructed
from such matter record arclength along their trajectories. Read appears to agree when he
writes,
Why should one restrict to those solutions of GR in which the SEP is satisfied?
The reason is that this principle ... is typically regarded to constitute and impor-
tant condition for the chronogeometricity if the metric field—that is, for intervals
as given by the metric field to be read off by stable rods and clocks built from
matter fields. (Read, 20??, p. 10)
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Similarly, Brown writes (and Read quotes approvingly):
That light rays trace out null geodesics of the field is again a consequence of the
strong equivalence principle, which asserts that locally Maxwell’s equations of
electrodynamics are valid. (Brown, 2005, p. 176)
In other words, Read and Brown claim that a system of differential equations satisfying the
SEP implies that (and explains why) (certain) solutions to that system will have certain
characteristic features that we associate with relativity.
Read and Brown both assert these claims without argument.46 To substantiate them,
one would ideally like to formulate and prove a theorem of the form:
Fix a system of differential equations on a Lorentzian manifold and suppose this
system satisfies the SEP with respect to that metric. Then the solutions to those
equations will have the following properties: (a) in a small body limit, they will
follow only timelike or null geodesics; (b) they do not propagate superluminally;
(c) they have other properties characteristic of extended matter, etc. etc.
Of course, to prove such a theorem, one needs to do a lot of work, first and most importantly
to make the SEP into a precise assertion. But even heuristically, I am not aware of any
evidence that this proposition is true. One might reply that it, or something like it, must
be true. I agree—but this is hardly an argument.47
46As do others: see, for instance, Knox (2019) or Myrvold (2019, pp. 18-9).
47One might worry that insofar as my main worry about the SEP, even appropriately clarified, is the one
given in this section, that ultimately my differences with Brown and Read come down to purely technical
considerations, and not philosophical ones. But I do not think this is correct. Proving the relevant theorems
may well be a mathematical exercise, but identifying what they should be, and even stating them precisely, is
a matter of deep interpretational importance with a long provenance (discussed, in part, in the final section
of this paper). I take it that the SEP reflects a particular idea about what, fundamentally, makes general
relativity a theory about “spacetime geometry” (or, “chronogeometry”). As such, whether it secures the
necessary results reflects on whether we truly understand what it means to attribute a certain geometry to
space and time, and ultimately what the physical (and even metaphysical) significance of general relativity
is.
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4. Functionalism Revisited, or, Some Good Advice that We Just Didn’t Take
Read writes that the focus of the dynamical/geometrical debate is the following question:
“Whence the metric field’s chronogeometric significance?” (Read, 20??, p. 11). In reaction
to this question—posed, not by Read, but by Adolf Gru¨nbaum (1977) some four decades
before—Howard Stein (1977) writes:
The question that seems to dominate your discussion ... is this: by virtue of
what is the tensor-field g to be regarded as representing the metrical structure
of space-time? Now that seems to me a legitimate question, but not a clear
and precise one: it seems to me (to use a distinction I appear to be growing
fond of) “presystematic” rather than “systematic,” and to pose a problem of
explication. I should be inclined to reformulate the question as: “Just what do
we mean when we say that this tensor-field describes the metrical structure of
space-time?” (Stein, 1977, p. 375)
Stein goes on to offer his own answer to this question.
[My answer] has a good deal to do with the theory of the behavior of such things
as measuring rods and clocks. But I would begin by making a preliminary,
and in my opinion quite crucial, remark. This is that there is no “categorical”
... no innate, a priori, or (in your language) “canonical” notion of the metric
of space-time. Indeed, nobody before Minkowski employed such a notion at
all. And when Minkowski invented, or discovered, this concept, what exactly
did he do? He showed that the special-relativistic theory of space and time
was tantamount to the statement that space-time has a particular structure,
whose attributes are suggestively (although not perfectly) analogous to those
of a Euclidean metric structure ... and from which ... the Eintein geometric,
chonometric, and kinematic relationships are determined. So we have two main
points: (1) a structure whose characteristics are, in a certain generalized sense,
of that mathematical species which is called “metrical”; (2) a theory according
to which the physical facts that belong, classically, to physical geometry (and
chronometry and kinematics) are manifestations of that structure. Geometry
having thus been “aufgehoben” into the Minkowski structure, one quite naturally
refers to the latter as “the geometrical structure of space-time.”(Stein, 1977, p.
377-8)
I take Stein, here, to be defending precisely what I have described as the “geometric view”
above, including endorsing what I previously referred to as (g) and (d); and to be providing
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an argument for why, on historical grounds, we should have understood (g) in such a way
that it implies (d).
One might be tempted to despair by these passages. Has the literature on these matters
made no progress in four decades? But to the contrary, I think a great deal of progress
has been made, specifically in answering Stein’s preferred question: “Just what do we mean
when we say that this tensor-field describes the metrical structure of space-time?” Stein
was prepared to say that we mean that certain structures that “measure” geometry—small
bodies, light rays, clocks—measure the properties described by the spacetime metric, and
leave it at that. But it has turned out that one can say more. That is, we can now be
more explicit, following Brown (2005), that what we mean by when we say that a particular
tensor field describes the metrical structure of spacetime is specifically that the metric bears
a particular relationship to the dynamics of these structures, or rather, the dynamics of
the matter that composes them. That relationship is manifest both in the role that the
metric plays in expressions of those dynamics and in features of their solutions. That such
a relationship exists is surely in the background of Stein’s remarks. But we have made
considerable progress in articulating just what it is.
So much the better for our understanding of space, time, and matter. But, as I have ar-
gued in the forgoing, there is still much more to say about Stein’s preferred question: what do
we mean when we say that a particular tensor field describes the metrical structure of space-
time? On the one hand, neither the substance nor the significance of the SEP is sufficiently
clear for it to explicate the idea that matter dynamics are adapted to the spacetime metric
in general relativity. And on the other hand, although there are results in the literature that
establish the sorts of links between matter field equations and our expectations about the
behavior of the structures that “measure” spacetime geometry, those results provide only a
partial picture of the complex network of relationships that one expects to hold. Thus, we
are closer to turning the “presystematic” questions discussed by Gru¨nbaum and Stein into
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systematic ones, and even ones that can be addressed by new work in mathematical physics;
but we are not there yet.
Despite this progress, there is a key point in Stein’s argument that has perhaps been
overlooked in the subsequent literature, but which I think is reflected in some of the dif-
ficulties I have just highlighted. It is a problem not so much for the dynamic view, but
rather for the “extension” to that view noted in the introduction to this paper: spacetime
functionalisnm.48 Of course, one worry for this view, at least as defended by Knox (2019),
that immediately rises from the forgoing discussion, is that Knox also invokes the SEP as her
justification that it is the metric in general relativity that does play the spacetime role; for
the reasons already noted, I think this is a problematic claim. But that is not my concern.
Rather, what I wish to emphasize is that even within general relativity, a theory we have
been working with for a century, to clearly and precisely articulate what it means for some
structure to “play the spacetime role” or to have “chronogeometric significance” is subtle
and difficult, and it is not clear that we have control over it. As Stein puts it, “there is
no ... ‘canonical’ notion of the metric of space-time.” In other words, the expectation that
a particular field, gab, does play a certain “spatio-temporal” or “chronogeometric” role, or
has a certain significance, arose only within the context of developing this particular theory.
The very idea of spacetime having a geometry in the relevant sense—of their being a “space-
time role” to play here at all—did not make sense before special relativity came along, and
changed dramatically once general relativity was introduced.
Looking backward, one can ask various questions along the lines of the ones discussed
48As noted above, Weatherall (2019, fn. 40) offers some considerations for why one should not be an inertial
frame functionalist; Read and Menon (2019) offer other arguments for why inertial frame functionalism has
limitations. The concerns I raise here are not about inertial frame functionalism in particular, but rather
the idea that one can say in advance what we even mean by “spacetime role” once and for all; identifying
that role with inertial frames is just one example. Baker (2019) argues that the spacetime concept is a “clus
ter concept”, in the sense that there are many different, related conditions that one would associate with
it without any of them being jointly necessary or sufficient for it to apply. That argument is closer to the
one I raise here, except that my emphasis is on how difficult and theory-dependent it is to identify what we
mean by “the spacetime role”.
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here, and identify conditions, within general relativity and closely related theories, that
would be sufficient for a structure to “play the spacetime role”. But the history of how
these concepts came about, and the difficulties associated with making them clear, make me
pessimistic that we can now say, once and for all, what it means to “play the spacetime role”
in a theory-independent way. Yet this is precisely what functionalism seeks to do: it is an
account of what spacetime is, and how we get to identify a structure as spacetime given the
dynamics of matter, independent of any theory.49 Indeed, as evidence for why one ought to
be pessimistic about this program, just observe how difficult it is to go from considerations
that make sense in special relativity, concerning, say, the Poincare´ invariance of dynamical
equations (in the sense of solutions of equations being mapped to other solutions by auto-
morphisms of Minkowski spacetime), to analogous considerations in general relativity. Why
not expect that to articulate the “spacetime role” in a successful theory of quantum gravity
will require even more complexity, or else draw on completely different concepts that we will
need to develop in the course of developing that theory?
Here, I think, we see an important distinction between two different claims with a func-
tionalist flavor. One is the claim that it is because the metric and its associated derivative
operator play certain roles in the dynamics of matter that that matter has the dynamical
properties (say, in the small-body limit) that one expects in general relativity. This claim,
which amounts to a line on what I called (B) above, could be substantiated in greater detail,
but seems almost certain to be true. But the second claim is that it is by virtue of playing a
particular, pre-specified role in a theory, irrespective of what that theory is, that a structure
counts as spacetime. This is clearly a much stronger claim, and one that I think should be
approached with caution.
49Some uses of functionalism in the recent literature, such as that of Knox (2013) and Lam and Wu¨thrich
(2018), have addressed a somewhat different question, namely, what would need to be the case for spacetime,
in the sense of general relativity, to “emerge” from a different theory, such as a theory with different
geometrical structure (Knox) or a quantum theory of gravity (Wu¨thrich and Lam). In this case, since
general relativity is the target, the concern that I raise here does not get purchase.
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